-Introduction
Risk capital is a factor which strongly influences the possibility of development of enterprises operating in a market economy, to such an extent that it becomes a catalyst of the other resources required for the business of the enterprise. The reason most frequently given by small and medium enterprises to justify recourse to the stock market by means of an Initial Public Offering (IPO) is the need to strengthen their financial status in view of the size they have attained, and therefore to finance the growth process by managing their financial leverage and issuing liquid liabilities (Ibbotson and Ritter, 1995; Brealey and Myers, 1996) . The IPO can be a growth tool when it is accompanied by existing dynamism of the company, as a result of which it performs successful strategies and on the basis of which it proposes to grow further (Chittenden, Hall and Hutchinson, 1996) . After the listing in a stock market enterprises increase the average duration of loans and reduce the size of guarantees, and the opinion expressed by lenders is no longer closely dependent on age and profitability. The decision by an enterprise to place its securities on the market is accompanied by the need for greater transparency of information, which in the context of the stock markets is an essential pre-requisite to gain investors' trust. A major current in the literature mainly attributes the phenomena of price departures from a correct theoretical trend to problems of efficient provision of information (Fama, 1998) . The pricing of IPOs in the short and medium term has formed the subject of numerous studies in recent years. The main problems encountered on the subject of correct pricing are associated with three main factors: underpricing, which relates to the price on the first day's listing, hot and cold issue markets, relating to seasonality during the year, and long-run underperformance, which indicates medium-term underperformance of the securities of newly-listed companies compared with the market average (Ibbotson, Ritter and Sindelar, 1994) . For the purpose of this paper, the most important phenomenon is long-run underperformance. Hot and cold issue markets are negligible in relation to the subject considered here, while underpricing (Ritter, 1987; Caretti and Romeo, 2000; Fabrizio and Samà, 2001; Giorgino, Giudici and Paleari, 2001 ) will only be important at the data selection stage. The subject of long-run underperformance (Khurshed, Mudambi and Goergen, 1999 ) is often associated with the shares of newly-listed small and medium companies (subsequently called "small caps"). This phenomenon is explained by a number of factors. Enterprises choose the time to list their shares not on the basis of financial requirements, but according to how advantageous it is for the controlling shareholder to sell (Ritter, 1991) ; in particular, shareholders seem to be interested in disposing of part of their holdings when they are aware that the company is on the verge of a negative cycle. The phenomenon appears to affect issuers which adopt balance sheet policies designed to improve the company's profitability artificially in order to obtain higher prices at the placement stage (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) ; profitability artificially increased by means of balance sheet policies obviously cannot be maintained in the medium term. Equally, long-run underperformance is directly attributable to the shareholders' decision to dispose of a large number of shares prior to the IPO, which considerably dilutes their holdings (Jensen and Meckling, 1976 ). If we shift our attention from the issuer to the investors, the phenomenon appears to be due to excessive optimism by the latter. This optimism is due to (i) incorrect analyses by financial analysts (Rajan and Sevaes, 1997) , (ii) availability of few shares at the time of the placement, which will therefore be purchased by the investors who take the most favourable view of the company's future (Miller, 1977) , and (iii) evaluation of the opportunities for the company's growth (Aggarwal and Rivoli, 1990) , also in terms of real options (Ammermann, 2000) , which will tend to be reduced in later years. Empirical checks conducted with reference to the Italian market (Fabrizio and Samà, 2001; Giorgino, Giudici and Paleari, 2001) appear to confirm that this phenomenon also exists in the Italian market, and also indicate a positive correlation between the performance and the size of the offering, the phenomenon of underpricing mainly being associated with small caps. The objective of the present research, starting from this line of studies, is to interpret the medium-term performance of the shares of newly-listed small and medium companies in terms of the correlation between stock market price trends and the ability of the company to attain the fundamental objectives declared at the listing stage and set out formally in the prospectus. The degree of correctness of the corporate information thus expressed allows us to introduce into the analysis the subject of efficient provision of information as a key to interpreting price trends. If this correlation were not confirmed, and in particular if the market undervalues the securities of companies which achieve the fundamental performances declared ex ante, a difficulty of the market in terms of its ability to price the shares of small caps correctly would be recognised, and the more general phenomenon of long-run underperformance identified in the literature would be confirmed, although it would be interpreted not in terms of opportunism by the issuer but of market bias towards small caps. The present study is structured as follows. The population considered, the type of data used and the analysis model employed are defined in para. 2. The analysis conducted and the results obtained with reference to the consistency of small caps in terms of ex post achievement of the company's objectives declared ex ante are reported in para. 3. The ability of the market to assess the securities of newly-listed small caps correctly is discussed in para. 4. Finally, the conclusions of the study are contained in para. 5.
-Definition of population, data gathering methodologies and analysis chart
For the purpose of selecting listings we considered relevant to the study, we began with a definition of medium-sized enterprise obtained from the literature. The criterion considered (Corbetta, 2000) defines as a medium-sized enterprise a company with annual revenues of between 25 and 500 million euros and between 250 and 1000 employees. However, we preferred to adopt a less restrictive criterion, considering as a small cap any company that meets at least one of the two size requirements, in order to increase the size of the population considered. On the basis of these selection parameters, we identified all the companies listed on the markets of Borsa Italiana S.p.A. in the 1995 -2000 period. Subsequently, the field of investigation was restricted by excluding:
• listings by companies operating in the financial sector, in view of their specificity;
• listings which took the form of an OPV (public offering of existing shares), because it was assumed that this placement technique has the sole objective of reallocating ownership of the company, not of funding company growth; • listings which took the form of an OPVS (public offering of newly-issued and existing shares) but were conducted in the ambit of a partial or total privatisation programme (PIPO), since the companies in question were not private companies but assets held by the State. 87 listings, which took the form of an OPS (public offering of newly-issued shares) or the mixed form of an OPVS, were therefore identified. These listings were destined for subsequent trading on the first market (MTA), 53 companies, and the New Market (NM), 34 companies. Of the 87 listings, three are not valid observations (Reno de Medici, Savino del Bene and Zucchini, all listed on the MTA) as the prospectus could not be obtained. The starting population therefore consisted of 84 observations, as shown in Table 1. <<insert Table 1>> The ex ante objectives were classified on the basis of the incremental growth strategies model (Gibb, 1991; Corbetta, Delmestri, Forestieri and Zara, 1994) , which can be summed up as follows:
growth is manifested through the operational dimension (increase in value of sales and market shares) and the structural dimension (growth of assets in capital invested and growth of employees); the average Italian company tends to follow a precise scale of priorities in the strategic decisions adopted to achieve growth: growth by internal lines in the core business → diversification (of product/process, type of customer served, or geographical market served) correlated with core business → growth by external lines through acquisitions; growth stages alternate with transition stages in which the company develops restructuring (turnaround) strategies designed to consolidate the growth achieved and prepare it for the next stage. In accordance with this interpretation, 11 variables were identified, and organised in five groups: A. growth of operational dimension, B. growth through investments in the core business, C. growth through investments in correlated diversification, D. growth through investments by external lines, E. financial restructuring (transitional phase). Table 2 introduces the 11 variables by group.   <<insert table 2>> The number and type of the objectives pursued during the ex ante phase by the company intending to be listed is measured by the presence/absence of each of the 11 variables, detected by analysing the strategies declared in the prospectus.
The expression "ex post objectives" means the economic/financial results obtained two and four years after the year prior to the year of company's flotation. The aim is to assess the degree of consistency between the growth objectives declared at the listing stage (the ex ante objectives) and the following performance (the ex post objectives). The economic/financial results are measured by constructing ratios consistent with the theory of financial value drivers (Rappaport, 1987; Copeland et. al., 1992) , the database for which is constituted by the economic and capital values reported in the accounts for the year. The economic and capital values considered are defined in Table 3 ; they relate to measurements of the company's operational activity (income, capital invested, operating profits and net profitability) and measurements of its financial structure (debt position, shareholders' equity and cost of loan capital).
<<insert table 3>>
Nine ratios were identified from the values defined above, and divided into five cognitive areas: a. development of operational dimension, b. development of structural dimension, c. trend of operating profits, d. trend of cost of debt capital, e. trend of return on equity capital. The calculation algorithms are set out in Table 4 .
<<insert table 4>>
After defining the measurements of the ex ante and ex post objectives it was possible to establish a model of logical connection between them, in order to achieve correspondence between the measurements and therefore define the level of consistency between the results declared at the listing stage and those achieved in subsequent years. The connection diagram is set out in Table 5 . The results measured by the ratios relating to groups c. (operational profitability) and e. (profitability of share capital) can be considered universal, because these objectives are pursued by any company that lists its shares on the stock market.
<<insert table 5>>
The ex post objectives were measured at two different times, after two and four years. Time t(0) was the year prior to the year of listing; consequently, (i) t(2) corresponds to the year after the year of listing and (ii) t(4) corresponds to the third year after the year of listing. For companies listed in the year 2000, only biennial measurements were possible (the years 1999-2001) . We decided always to calculate the ratios as sole variations in the observation period considered, even where intermediate measurements were available, as in the case of the fouryear observation, within which the two-year observation period falls. This choice is justified by the need to avoid a "distorting" factor caused by variations in the value of the ratio in the two different observation periods (intermediate value after two years and final value after four years), in order to exclude the time effect from the factors that determine the degree to which consistency between the objectives is achieved.
The starting measurement of the prices 1 of individual securities used was the closing price of the shares on the first day's trading. The decision to consider the closing price on the first day's trading at time t(0) rather than the placement price was due to the wish to eliminate underpricing phenomena, which relate above all to the placement of small caps. Studies on the subject tend to attribute underpricing more to an undervaluation of or discount on the placement price of the shares on the primary market than to an overvaluation of the shares by the secondary market during the first few days' trading.
2 The price measurement used to identify the share valuation expressed by the market in successive periods is given by the 1 The market data relating to share prices and index values were obtained from the Datastream-AFO database. 2 For a review of the main explanations of underpricing in the literature, see Fabrizio and Samà, op. cit. arithmetical mean of the historical series of closing prices on an annual basis. The year in question coincides with the financial year in which the fundamental data for measurement of the ex post objectives were extracted. Consequently, the valuation expressed by the market is initially calculated as the percentage variation between the price on the first day's trading and the annual average of the end of the reference period, t(2) or t(4). As the trend of a share price is definitely influenced by the trend of the market as a whole, this effect must be stripped from the price variation. Consequently, the valuation expressed by the market is adjusted for the effect of the market trend by calculating it as the difference between the price variation, as defined, and the corresponding variation in the market as a whole. Calculation of the market variation requires the introduction of a representative index. For the purposes of this analysis it was decided to adopt a dual interpretation: the general Comit index, i.e. an index representative of the entire stock market; Midex and Numtel, which are more specific indexes representative of the small caps, MTA and NM segments respectively.
Like the price variation, the variation in the index is defined as the difference between the value of the index on the first day's trading and the annual arithmetical mean at the end of the reference period. The market valuation will therefore be expressed as the difference between: (1) the percentage variation in the price of the individual shares, calculated on the time scale considered, and (2) the percentage variation in the measurement of the chosen index, calculated on the same time scale, according to the following notation:
where: V = market performance; P 0 = closing price of shares on the first day of trading; P t = arithmetical mean of closing prices for year t on an annual basis; t = observation period; I 0 = value of index on the first day of trading in the shares; I t = arithmetical mean of values of index for year t on an annual basis.
The valuation thus expressed consequently indicates an opinion of the underperformance or outperformance of the specific shares compared with the market trend. The observations in question can therefore be classified between companies that outperform the market, and are therefore appreciated by it, and those which underperform the market, and are therefore penalised by it.
-Analysis of fundamental performances 3

Analysis of "ex ante" objectives
A cluster analysis was performed 4 to classify the 84 5 observations in terms of the types of declared ex ante objectives. The processing conducted identified three homogeneous groups of observations. Table 6 shows the main measurements that describe the positioning of each cluster in relation to the variables of the ex ante objectives.
<<insert table 6>>
The interpretation of the analysis results is as follows. Cluster 1 (39 observations): identifies companies strongly characterised by the objective of restructuring (E1) accompanied by the objective of growth of the operational dimension (A1); this cluster comprises 5 companies which only declared the objective of operational growth, but not the objective of restructuring. Cluster 2 (17 observations, including Castelgarden D02P): identifies companies which invest by internal lines (especially manufacturing investments/B1) and declared the objective of product/process diversification (C1); they are also distinguished by the total absence of the objectives of acquisition (D1) and geographical diversification (C2), and almost total absence of restructuring (E1); they also have the lowest average values for the growth objective relating to the operational dimension. Cluster 3 (28 observations): identifies companies that aim to grow through external lines (D1, all); it includes a sub-group of 4 companies which have the objectives of diversification (C1 and C2) and restructuring (E1) in addition to the main objective. The three clusters identify three groups of companies which have declared objectives consistent with the requirements of the incremental growth strategy model. In particular, clusters 2 and 3 identify companies that say they wish to undertake, or have already undertaken, stages of growth, while cluster 1 identifies companies that are going through or about to go through a transitional phase. The three clusters were therefore named as follows:
CexA_1: financial restructuring with operational growth; CexA_2: growth of core business by internal lines; CexA_3: growth by external lines.
For each one a correspondence was established with the measurements of the ex post objectives introduced in para. 2, in order to design a model of virtuous behaviour in terms of ex post results to be verified in the subsequent analyses. The chart of correspondences between the clusters of ex ante objectives and measurements of the ex post objectives is set out in Table 7. <<insert table 7>>
Analysis of "ex post" objectives (two-year observation)
In order to reduce the number of variables describing the ex post objectives, a factor analysis, principal components method, was conducted. Four factors which explain 74.1% of the overall variability were extracted, and this result was considered satisfactory (see Table 8 ).
The interpretation attributed to the factors is as follows (see Table 9 ): F1 = creation of value (efficacy); F2 = use of capital raised in (expanding) the structure; F3 = effect of scale (operational dimension) on cost of debt (capital); F4 = expansion of structure with borrowing (and destruction of value).
<<insert Table 8 and Table 9>> The most important factor is pursuing value creation strategies (F1); this result is consistent with the expectations of investors on the capital market, and summarises the objectives of developing operational profitability (group c) and share capital (group e), which are considered essential by a company applying for listing. The second factor (F2) indicates financing of investments in expansion of the structure (group b) by raising equity capital, indicated indirectly by a reduction in the leverage ratio and the ratio of the cost of financial capital on sales (d1 and d2). This use of the capital raised is consistent with companies which have declared structural growth objectives, regardless of the strategies used to pursue them (CexA 2 and CexA 3). The third factor is interpreted as a partial result of financial restructuring (F3), indicating a scale effect on the reduction in the cost of financial capital (d3) generated by growth of the operational dimension (a1). This restructuring is considered partial because there is no significant connection between F3 and the variable that explains the trend of the leverage ratio (d1). The fourth factor in terms of explained variance (F4) shows a correlation between expansion of the structure (b1) and cost of financing (d2) and, to a lesser extent, expansion of the leverage ratio (d1); it is also negatively correlated with the trend of the operational profitability indicators (c2 and c1). It was interpreted as expansion of the structure by means of recourse to borrowing and a corresponding destruction of operating value, indicating a situation that conflicts with the typology of objectives declared ex ante. When the number of variables that explain the volatility of the ex post performance had been reduced by identifying the four factors, a cluster analysis was performed to classify the observations in homogeneous groups. Prior to the cluster analysis an exploratory survey was performed to identify the presence of outliers liable to prejudice its significance. The exploratory investigation identified 13 observations out of the population of 83 companies; 11 companies of the 13 extracted have securities listed on the NM. Table 10 lists the outliers and their positionings in relation to the four explanatory factors.
<<insert table 10>>
The cluster analysis subsequently conducted on the 70 observations identified four homogeneous groups, which were interpreted as follows: 6 Cluster 1 (14 observations): identifies the companies that create most value on average (F1+) but use the capital raised to make investments to a lesser extent (F2-). This behaviour is confirmed by the fact that all the shares observed were placed by means of the OPVS method, which means that part of the capital raised was collected by existing shareholders. They do not have a dimensional advantage relating to the cost of debt (F3-), to which they tend to have recourse to make investments (F4+). Cluster 2 (44 observations): identifies companies which always generate value (F1+), tend to use the capital raised for investments to a slightly lower than average extent (F2-), and are substantially neutral in relation to the dimensional effect on the cost of borrowing, the type of capital that they use least to support investments (F4-). Cluster 3 (5 observations): identifies companies which destroy value (F1-), tend not to implement an investment programme supported by the capital raised (F2-), and do not benefit from any reduction in the cost of borrowing (F3-). Cluster 4 (7 observations): companies which underperform in relation to the use of the capital raised to implement their investment plan (F2+), and take advantage of the dimensional effect to reduce the cost of borrowing (F3+), a type of capital that they tend not to use to make investments (F4-); they are substantially neutral regards value creation. The majority of the observations are positioned in cluster 2, which shows a company profile that has recourse to the market to raise capital to make investments, and already improves its value creation performance in the short term (two years). The second-largest cluster in terms of the aggregate number of observations (cluster 1) includes the group of restructurers which only partly used the capital raised to make expansion investments, but nevertheless generated value. The other two clusters, though quantitatively inferior, reflect two company profiles that tend to hold extreme positions. Cluster 3 clearly identifies companies that were unable to meet the objectives which a company listed on the stock market should presumably achieve. Cluster 4 comprises companies which are heavy investors but were unable to produce an increase in value in the time scale considered. In the analysis thus conducted, the 13 outliers identified earlier were added to the 70 companies to avoid loss of information. On the basis of a careful observation it was decided to aggregate outliers CHL (F07N), Dada (F08N) and I-Net (F20N) on the ground of similarity with cluster 4, which thus had a total of 10 observations. The other 10 outliers were divided into two groups in view of their marked specificity compared with the profiles of the clusters previously identified: outliers with negative performance (cluster 5, 6 observations) which failed to meet the declared ex ante objectives: Roma (F05P), Gandalf (E01N), Opengate (E04N), e-Biscom (F13N), Freedomland (F19N) and Inferentia (F21N); outliers with positive performance (cluster 6, 4 observations) which met the declared ex ante objectives: Ducati (E02P), Tiscali (E06N), Acotel (F01N) and Vitaminic (F28N).
The names assigned to the four main clusters and the two clusters of outliers were as follows:
CexP_1: restructurers of financial structure (and value creators); CexP_2: developing companies (and value creators); CexP_3: declining companies; CexP_4: major investors in growth; CexP_5: outliers with negative performance; CexP_6: outliers with positive performance.
The classification of the observations in homogeneous groups based on achievement of the ex post objectives, like the phase of analysis of the declared ex ante objectives, enabled us, by crosstabulating the former with the latter, to establish the degree of fit between the performance achieved and the promises made to the market by newly-listed small caps. The interpretation of the results of the crosstabulation between the clusters of ex ante and ex post objectives is based on the associations between the two types of objectives introduced in para. 3.1. The table below summarises the results of the cross-tabulation. The cluster of ex ante restructurers (CexA_1) is judged to be consistent with membership of groups CexP_1 (OPVS) and CexP_2, in which the objective of restructuring is accompanied by that of growth, for a total of 30 observations. However, in both cases the correspondence with the starting cluster is not perfect, perhaps due to the number of "secondary" objectives declared in it compared with the main objectives of operational growth and restructuring. 7 observations, belonging to groups CexP_3, CexP_4 and CexP_5, are judged to be inconsistent with membership of the starting cluster. The remaining 2 observations belonging to CexP_6 identify a developing company, similar to the profile of CexP_2 (Ducati E02P), and a strongly growing company similar to CexP_4 (Tiscali E06N), which in any event achieved a positive performance. The cluster of growth by internal lines (CexA_2) presents 13 consistent observations, in correspondence with CexP_2 and CexP_4, although those in the last cluster do not achieve the objective of creating value. The other 3 are outliers belonging to CexP_5 and can be considered inconsistent because of their negative performance. The cluster of growth by external lines (CexA_3) is judged to be consistent with clusters CexP_2 and CexP_4, although in this case value generation is lacking, and with CexP_6, for a total of 17 observations. The remaining 11 observations, belonging to groups CexP_1, CexP_3 and CexP_5, can be considered inconsistent, although the 6 observations in CexP_1 are value generators. A total of 75% of the companies proved to be consistent with the declared ex ante objectives two years after the listing, although with different levels of consistency. This result seems to support the reliability of the declarations made in company prospectuses, at least as regards the qualitative expression of the company's objectives pursued through the listing. 7 Clusters CexA_1 and CexA_2 show a basically homogeneous distribution and an above-average frequency of consistent observations, exceeding 80%. Cluster CexA_3 (growth by external lines), however, shows a discrepancy of behaviour from the two preceding clusters, with a 61% frequency of consistent observations. From the standpoint of investors, companies that declare an acquisition objective as a priority seem to be riskier than those which give priority to growth by internal lines and/or restructuring objectives.
Analysis of "ex post" objectives (four-year observation)
In terms of observations, 34 companies were eliminated in this analysis, corresponding to listings in the year 2000, as the four-year observation was not available. Of the 49 companies analysed, two (Deroma C04P and Buffetti D06P) were suspended from trading during their fourth year of listing 8 and can therefore be considered less significant observations, especially for the subsequent comparison between ex post objectives and prices. As in the case of the two-year time scale, a factor analysis, principal components method, was conducted on the four-year observation in order to reduce the number of variables describing the ex post objectives. Four factors which explain 80.4% of the overall variability were extracted, and this result was considered satisfactory (see Table 13 ). The interpretation attributed to the factors is as follows (see Table 14 ): F1 = effect of scale (structural dimension) on cost of debt (capital); F2 = creation of value (efficacy); F3 = borrowing and destruction of value (with operational growth); F4 = operational growth (without increase in value for shareholders). <<insert table 13 and table 14>> The changeover from the two-year to the four-year historical series has repercussions on the type of components interpreted and their order of importance.
9
By comparison with the factors that emerged in the two-year analysis, the four-year analysis confirmed the presence of the components "value creation", "effect of scale on cost of capital", with a variation which will be commented on subsequently, and "borrowing, expansion of structure and destruction of value", again with differences which will be commented on later. The component "use of capital raised" unsurprisingly disappears after four years, and is replaced by that of "operational expansion without value for shareholders". In terms of importance, the "scale effect" factor has a preponderant weight over the others in terms of explained variance, whereas the "value creation" factor loses importance, falling to second place. The first factor in terms of importance (F1) shifts the weights from the operational to the structural dimension (b1 and b2), with a plus sign, whereas it maintains the negative relationship with the cost of capital (d2 and d3). The effect of scale on the cost of capital is strengthened in terms of explained variance compared with the two-year figure. The second factor in terms of importance (F2) is value creation. The distribution and mathematical sign of the weights already found in the two-year analysis is basically confirmed, whereas it loses importance in terms of explained variance. The factor relating to borrowing and destruction of value (F3) is mainly connected positively with the weight of expansion of the leverage ratio (d1) and negatively with the operational profitability trend (c2), as if to indicate a worsening of the company's financial standing. The aspect of expansion of size has a lower weight and is positively connected with the trend of the operational dimension (a1). The fourth factor in terms of importance (F4), interpreted as operational growth (without an increase in value for shareholders), is explained positively by the trend of the operational dimension (a1) and the profitability trend (c2). Smaller contributions to its explanation are made by the cost of financial capital (d2), with a positive weight, and the trend of profitability for shareholders (e1), with a negative weight. As in the preceding analysis, we explored the data liable to identify the presence of outliers in order to allow subsequent cluster analysis to be conducted on the four factors identified. The exploratory investigation identified 7 observations out of the population of 49 companies. 3 of them are NM companies, namely 50% of all the companies considered on that market. Table  15 lists the outliers and their positioning in correspondence to the factors.
<<insert table 15>>
The cluster analysis subsequently conducted on the 42 observations identified three homogeneous groups, which were interpreted as follows.
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Cluster 1 (14 observations): the factors that mainly characterise it are F2+ (companies which create most value on average) and F3+ (recourse to borrowing for growth). It identifies companies which pursue dimensional growth, also confirmed by the positive weight of F4 (operational growth) and which borrow, without managing on average to exploit the dimensional effect on the cost of debt capital (F1); they are consequently companies that create operational and also financial value, but by increasing risk. Cluster 2 (8 observations): the most characteristic factor is the absence of recourse to borrowing, and destruction of value (F3-). Components F1+ (moderate ability to exploit the dimensional effect), F2+ (creation of value) and F4-(below-average operational growth) are also highly characteristic. This group identifies companies that always generate value but tend to stop growing and to rationalise their financial leverage. Cluster 3 (20 observations): identifies companies which destroy value (F2-), tend not to exploit the dimensional effect (F1-), reduce their recourse to borrowing (F3-) and do not create operational value (F4-). As it is a cluster with lower weights at the centre of the observations for all four factors considered, it indicates a group of companies which are static or declining. It is significant that some 50% of the observations fall into the group defined as static or declining companies after a four-year period. This seems to indicate the fair difficulty faced by small caps in sustaining the challenging objectives imposed by the decision to go public over the long term. The second-largest cluster identifies companies that are still in a growth phase, generate more value for shareholders on average, but also have greater recourse to borrowing without managing to exploit the dimensional effect in order to limit its cost. In the researcher's opinion, these companies have increased their risk profile compared with the starting situation because they are still in a phase of development, while at the same time, the growth of their financial exposure seems to indicate that the capital raised on listing was insufficient. Any of them has raised a second round of equity finance in the period of time observed. The second cluster identifies companies which are more static, with a consolidated financial structure, and generators of value, consistently with the classic profile of an investment typical of a long-term investor. In the analysis thus conducted, the outliers identified earlier were added to the 42 companies to avoid loss of information. All the outliers were divided into two groups in view of their marked specificity compared with the profiles of the three clusters identified: outliers with negative performance (cluster 5, 3 observations) which failed to meet the declared ex ante objectives: Gandalf (E01N), Lazio (D08P) and Vemer (E11P); outliers with positive performance (cluster 6, 4 observations) which met the declared ex ante objectives: Ducati (E02P), Opengate (E04N), Tiscali (E06N) and Idrapresse (C05P).
The names assigned to the three main clusters and the two clusters of outliers are as follows: CexPP_1: growing companies (which have recourse to debt); CexPP_2: cash cows; CexPP_3: static/declining companies; CexPP_5: negative outliers; CexPP_6: positive outliers.
As in the case of the two-year analysis, the clusters of ex ante and ex post objectives thus obtained were crosstabulated to identify their degree of consistency. Table 16 shows the results of the processing. The cluster of ex ante restructurers (CexA_1) is considered consistent with membership of groups CexPP_2 and CexPP_6, for a total of 10 observations; the 7 observations belonging to group CexPP_1, though positive in terms of performance, are not considered consistent, because the companies resume the growth of debt and the underlying risk; a further 14 observations (CexPP_3 and CexPP_5) identify companies that failed to achieve their initial objectives. The cluster of growth by internal lines (CexA_2) presents 3 consistent observations (CexPP_1) and 1 belonging to CexPP_2, which could mean that the growth strategy has petered out; the other 3 (CexPP_3 and CexPP_5) identify inconsistent companies. The cluster of growth by external lines (CexA_3) is considered consistent with clusters CexPP_1 and CexPP_6, for a total of 5 observations; the other 6 observations, belonging to groups CexPP_3 and CexPP_5, can be considered inconsistent. None of the companies in this group falls into cluster CexPP_2 (cash cows). Table 17 summarises the crosstabulation between the two categories of clusters, distributing the observations according to the criterion of consistency or inconsistency with the declared ex ante objectives.
<<insert table 17>>
The changeover from the two-to four-year historical series demonstrates two fundamental aspects. (i) A considerable reduction in the frequency of companies with performance consistent with the objectives declared in the prospectus (from 75% al 39%, with a negative variation of -48%). This appears to indicate a considerable deterioration in the reliability profile of ex ante declarations over time. (ii) A significant increase in risk associated with the group of restructurers, as the frequency of companies that fall into the group of value destroyers ex post considerably increases, although it includes nearly all the cash cows. The risk profile of the other two groups also worsens, as the observations shift towards the area of inconsistency, compared with the findings made in the two-year observation period. However, the small number of observations belonging to these two groups, compared with those in CexA_1, mean that greater caution is required when generalising from them. 
4.-Check on market valuation capacity
The check on the ability of the market to evaluate small caps correctly on the basis of their fundamental performances was conducted by measuring the degree of consistency between the extent to which the objectives declared at the listing stage were achieved, as measured in para. 3 above, and the share prices of the companies listed, expressed in terms of the difference in their percentage variation during the period considered compared with the variation in a suitable market index during the same period. For the purpose of obtaining a sufficiently selective breakdown of the observations in terms of pricing expressed by the market we formed three clusters of companies valued by the market as outperforming, underperforming, or around the market average. In detail:
Cluster 1 comprises companies which are overpriced/outperforming compared with the market; Cluster 2 identifies companies which are underpriced/underperforming compared with the market; Cluster 0 comprises companies distributed around the market average within the range [-10%; +10%]; the observations that fall into this cluster are considered to be substantially in line with the performance of the market. Table 18 shows the allocation of each of the 83 observations to the three price clusters on the basis of the time frame considered (two or four years) and of the index used to measure the market trend (general Comit index or specific index). The same 83 observations were then classified in terms of consistency/inconsistency on the basis of the degree to which the ex ante objectives were achieved, according to the findings of the analysis described in para. 3, by allocating them to one of the following two clusters (see Table 19 ):
Consistency_cluster 1: consistent with objectives Consistency_cluster 2: inconsistent with objectives. <<insert table 18 and table 19>> The check on the pricing capacity of the market thus depends on the level of correlation found, for each observation, between membership of the cluster of companies consistent with their objectives and membership of Price Cluster 1, or at most Cluster 0, or conversely, correlation between membership of the cluster of companies inconsistent with their objectives and membership of Price Cluster 2, or at most Cluster 0. The results of the crosstabulation analysis will be shown on the basis of a sequence that involves:
analysis first over a two-year period and then over a four-year period; in the ambit of the same time frames, first analysis that measures the price as the difference on the Comit general index and then analysis that compares it with the specific index.
Observation after 2 years and Comit index: the market shows a limited valuation capacity, the number of observations correctly positioned in Price Clusters 1 and 2 amounting to only 41% of the total, a frequency that rises to 54% if the observations positioned in Cluster 0 are also considered (see Table 20 ). When a distinction is made on the basis of consistency of objectives, it is evident that the market is very good at valuing inconsistent companies, as only 4 companies out of 21 (19%) were overpriced, whereas it has difficulty in rewarding consistent companies, no less than 34 out of 62 (over 50%) being penalised. The presence of underperformance therefore seems to be confirmed. Observation after 2 years and Midex-Numtel indexes: although the phenomenon of underperformance in relation to the consistent observations persists (31 out of 62, ie. 50%), the changeover to sectoral indexes shows a reduction in severity, although it is not selective because more inconsistent than consistent companies benefit from it on a proportional basis (see Table 21 ). This appears to indicate that the valuation capacity of the market represented by specific indexes is lower than the valuation capacity represented by the general index. Observation after 4 years and Comit index: the changeover to a four-year observation period seems to indicate a lower selection capacity by the market and more severe judgements, as if there were a bias in favour of small caps. In particular (see Table 22 ), the frequency of consistent companies penalised by the market increases (12 observations out of 19, ie. 63%), whereas the ability to value inconsistent companies is strengthened (only 13% of the inconsistent companies are outperforming). In view of the reversal of proportions between consistent and inconsistent companies and following the changeover from a two-year to a four-year analysis, the underperformance encountered in the two-year analysis and measured by the market price could be justified as anticipating a deterioration in consistency, which is confirmed by the four-year measurement. Observation after 4 years and Midex-Numtel indexes: the changeover to specific indexes further accentuates the frequency of negative judgements, which do not distinguish significantly between outperforming and underperforming companies but penalise them all indiscriminately, thus reversing the trend that emerged in the corresponding two-year observation (see Table 23 ). This analysis seems to confirm the theory that underperformance is a very widespread phenomenon which is significantly correlated with the size of the operation. 
5.-Conclusions
The research increases the knowledge of the ability of newly-listed small caps to achieve their fundamental objectives declared at the listing stage, and the ability of the stock market to price the shares of these companies correctly.
As regards examination of fundamental performances in the two-year analysis, we found a good degree of ability by companies (75%) to achieve fundamental results (ex post objectives) in line with their intentions stated at the listing stage (ex ante objectives). Within this period, behaviour differs according to the type of objectives declared; it is better in the case of restructurers and companies that grow by internal lines, and worse in the case of companies that grow by external lines. The positive economic cycle during the years in question (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) may have influenced this result. However, with reference to the operations to which the research relates, namely OPV and OPVS operations on the Italian stock market, behaviour which would bear out the theory that shareholders opportunistically choose the time of listing to coincide with the end of a growth phase in order to maximise their efficiency does not appear to be significantly widespread. The rate of consistency declines considerably (39%) in the changeover from the two-year to the four-year observation period; this reduction particularly applies to the cluster of restructurers. This appears to demonstrate the difficulty faced by small caps in achieving ambitious growth and profitability objectives, which typically require a stock market listing, in the medium term.
As regards the share performance analysis, in the two-year observation the market showed a bias towards small caps which led it to value the majority of inconsistent companies correctly, but at the same time, it excessively penalised the consistent companies (at least 50%), which achieved both their declared ex ante objectives and an increase in their value generation.
The changeover from two to four years shows a lower valuation capacity by the market, which becomes significantly more penalising, partly due to a reduction in the rate of consistency with objectives by companies over the longer term. Assuming that the market has a greater valuation capacity, the bias found in the two-year analysis could be attributed to the forecast that the performance will deteriorate when measured in the four-year observation.
To sum up, the phenomenon of long-run underperformance was observed even for companies whose operational performance is consistent with the objectives declared when the prospectus was issued, and which have shown an improvement in their economic/financial, growth and profitability parameters compared with the pre-listing situation. Key: Vttl = variance calculated on the population Mttl = arithmetical mean calculated on the population V_C1 = variance calculated on the observations in cluster 1 M_C1 = arithmetical mean calculated on the observations in cluster 1 V_C2 = variance calculated on the observations in cluster 2 M_C2 = arithmetical mean calculated on the observations in cluster 2 V_C3 = variance calculated on the observations in cluster 3 M_C3 = arithmetical mean calculated on the observations in cluster 3 
